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Perspectives on the Global 
Partnership for Effective 
Development Cooperation
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Abstract The establishment of the Global Partnership for Effective 
Development Co-operation (GPEDC) created the unique opportunity to 
bring together and explore synergies between South–South cooperation 
(SSC) and traditional aid, or North–South cooperation. However, 
the GPEDC lacks support from both sides due to a lack of trust and 
misconceptions among partner countries. This article discusses the 
challenges of operationalising the GPEDC as a truly global and inclusive 
partnership. This is done by analysing differences between North–South 
and South–South cooperation and the challenges of bringing them closer. 
Furthermore, the particular reasons of individual SSC providers, the rising 
powers in particular, for withholding support for the GPEDC are identified 
and looked at in the context of fundamental differences between SSC and 
OECD-DAC aid.
Keywords: Global Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation, 
rising powers, South–South cooperation, China’s development aid, 
emerging countries.
1 Introduction
The international development community has long focused on the 
complex aid paradigm concerning the North–South relationship 
since its inception. The last decade has seen many changes in this 
relationship, particularly in terms of  the rise of  the global South. 
The successful development experience of  China and other emerging 
economies, and the growing prominence of  Southern voices and 
influences at the level of  international development organisations 
and processes, make this change more significant and concrete. The 
high-level debate on aid effectiveness led by the Development Assistance 
Committee (DAC) of  the Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (OECD) is a case in point. The First High Level 
Forum on Aid Effectiveness (HLF-1) was held in Rome in 2003 
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and is considered a milestone for engaging multiple stakeholders in 
international development to discuss the effectiveness of  development 
assistance. This forum and those that followed (Paris in 2005 and Accra 
in 2008) yielded important changes to the norms and guiding principles 
for delivering assistance for international development.
Yet, the emergence of  new sources of  development finance, including 
South–South cooperation (SSC), led to the recognition that this 
normative framework needed to be extended to new players and revised. 
This eventually led to a new forum for deliberating on development 
aid effectiveness that materialised in the establishment of  the Global 
Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation (GPEDC) at the 
Fourth High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness (HLF-4) in 2011, held 
in Busan, South Korea. Despite the change in institutional structures 
(including through the involvement of  the United Nations) and an 
increase in the participation of  different stakeholders, the dynamics of  
power underpinning the global aid system, notably the dominance by 
the OECD-DAC, remains unchanged.
The first high-level meeting for the GPEDC was held on 15–16 April 
2014 in Mexico City. More than 1,500 participants from more than 
130 countries, multilateral and bilateral development agencies, as well 
as the private sector and non-governmental organisations (NGOs), 
participated in this event. In the opening session, UN Secretary-General, 
Ban Ki-moon addressed many critical issues relating to the development 
financing framework of  the Post-2015 Agenda: namely, global 
macroeconomic policy, development aid, trade, and debt. He pointed 
out that some of  the least developed countries were either trapped in 
conflict or could not benefit from the global financial market despite the 
importance of  official development assistance (ODA). He also noted that 
the traditional donor–recipient relationship was changing and that the 
ever-increasing role of  SSC offered new prospects for global development.
The president of  Mexico, Enrique Peña Nieto, also expressed his wish 
to establish a new international development framework that was 
more inclusive, sustainable, and that would yield effective cooperation. 
Additionally, participants discussed progress made on the commitments 
established at the HLF-4 in Busan, which had focused on domestic 
financial resources, the effectiveness of  SSC, middle-income country 
(MIC) development, and the role of  the private sector in global 
development (Ministry of  Foreign Affairs 2014). The forum finally 
released the document entitled Building Towards an Inclusive Post-2015 
Development Agenda and announced 38 follow-up measures that were 
agreed on and committed to by different countries, international 
organisations, NGOs, and thinktanks during the forum (GPEDC 2014).
There has been widespread debate on the significance of  this new 
partnership within the development community, as the outcome from 
the HLF-4 was criticised for being a much weaker and watered-down 
agreement than those in the past. This was because developing a 
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framework that would accommodate the diversity of  stakeholders’ 
needs required many compromises. Subsequently, it also left many loose 
ends (Besharati 2013). As such, it was expected that the Mexico City 
high-level meeting would begin a new era. However, although most of  
the major international development stakeholders attended the event, 
the initiative is still mainly coming from Western donors and this creates 
the fear of  the emerging powers that Western donors want to attract 
other development donors to continue an agenda that has been failing.
At the same time, the lack of  meaningful participation from China 
and India, as well as the suspicious attitude towards the partnership 
by Brazil and South Africa, strongly questions the legitimacy of  the 
new initiative. It can even be argued that the hope of  creating a new 
era of  equal cooperation between the traditional and newly emerging 
development players via this new partnership did not yield the 
expected results. As a result of  this, the transformation of  this existing 
international development cooperation structure remains unrealised. 
Although this new partnership signalled a paradigm shift from ‘aid 
effectiveness’ to ‘development effectiveness’, the wide range of  participation 
might fragment development cooperation plans, or even widen the gap.
Creating this collective forum outside the UN Development Forum 
might affect the legitimacy and authority of  the UN in discussing 
global development. However, it could be understood by this that 
the international development architecture has changed, and the 
influence of  the developed group has decreased. The new partnership 
has responded to this change and the new structure includes a wide 
range of  stakeholders from NGOs, thinktanks, the private sector, 
and representatives that are more legitimate than those comprising 
the 24 OECD-DAC membership (Fourth High Level Forum on Aid 
Effectiveness 2011).
This more optimistic proposition asserts that the new partnership is a 
good opportunity to develop a more inclusive, sustainable, and multiple 
stakeholder participation-based framework that shifts from the old ‘Aid 
Effectiveness’ agenda to the new ‘Development Effectiveness’ agenda, 
which was narrow, but nevertheless provided a space not only for China, 
but also for other developing countries to seek their own development 
model independently.
In fact, the emergence of  the GPEDC reflects the diversification of  
global power. On the one hand, historically, the domination of  Western 
power in development cooperation has been challenged by its decreasing 
financial supply capacity, and a lack of  effective progress in developing 
countries. On the other hand, the rise of  emerging nations with their 
financial capacity and successful development experiences, especially the 
large-scale poverty reduction and transformation that has taken place in 
China, has significantly influenced the global development cooperation 
system (Gu et al. 2014; Gu, Shankland and Chenoy 2016).
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Therefore, it is now the time to have a more inclusive global 
development cooperation structure, as an informal platform on which 
to exchange development cooperation experiences and lessons, that 
can support the global collective action taken by the UN Development 
Forum. In this regard, active participation from emerging development 
players such as China and India in this new initiative is critical. 
This article begins with a historical review of  the evolution of  the 
development partnership. Following this is an analysis of  why China 
and others were reluctant to join the GPEDC. Finally, this article 
will provide an assessment of  China’s future perspective towards 
this new partnership and provide recommendations that should 
help to build a more legitimate and inclusive global development 
cooperation partnership.
2 The historical evolution of the development cooperation partnership
The GPEDC was primarily derived from the HLF-4, held in November 
2011 in Busan. The HLF-4 concluded with an 11-page outcome 
document. This document called for the construction of  the GPEDC. 
Under the facilitation of  the OECD-DAC, all parties that attended 
the forum agreed to initiate this partnership (Fourth High Level Forum 
on Aid Effectiveness 2011). The OECD-DAC and the United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP) agreed to provide joint secretariat 
support (Working Party on Aid Effectiveness 2012). The Indonesian 
Minister of  Development Planning, Armida Alisjahbana, the Nigerian 
Minister of  Finance, Ngozi Okonjo-lweala, and the UK’s Minister 
of  Development, Justine Greening were proposed as co-chairs of  the 
steering committee that would be responsible for the meetings and 
annual events, but the composition of  both co-chairs and steering 
committee presented two major concerns.
Firstly, due to the vital future roles of  both the recipient and emerging 
countries in the international development policy arena, it was 
agreed that it was necessary for the representatives from those two 
groups to be co-chairs, and to be included on the steering committee. 
Secondly, it was agreed that along with the increasing role of  NGOs, 
particularly new development foundations and private sectors, new 
development partnerships should also include a wide range of  actors. 
Despite the argument that this proposal would not reach the expected 
goal of  improving aid effectiveness, the GPEDC presented a different 
form from previous discussions on aid effectiveness which had been 
dominated by the OECD-DAC members, and marked a milestone for 
global development cooperation governance.
Thus, the HLF-4 in Busan signified the end of  the ‘Aid Effectiveness’ 
agenda; instead, it ushered in a broad-based Development Effectiveness 
agenda that became the central theme of  a new future development 
cooperation partnership. Three years after the HLF-4, a wide range of  
stakeholders from recipient countries, traditional development partners, 
NGOs, and private sector members participated in the HLF-1. Contrary 
to the then mounting expectations, China completely declined to 
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participate, India sent its diplomat stationed in Mexico City, and Brazil’s 
delegate disagreed with the whole agenda.
Lack of  an active response from the emerging actors to the HLF-1 raised 
the question as to why the emerging development actors were reluctant to 
such an open proposal that clearly offered compromises. To understand 
this, one needs to start by reviewing how the traditional aid architecture 
has developed. The emerging actors still perceive the GPEDC as 
representing the hidden dominance of  the Western aid regime, in terms 
of  moving from the previous ‘aid’ agenda to the current ‘development’ 
agenda without a substantive change in its character.
The HLF-4 renewed the global development cooperation architecture 
by establishing a new, legitimate, multiple stakeholder partnership, 
and more importantly, shifted the aid-focused agenda to the 
development-focused agenda to better reflect the changing nature 
of  international development, especially in light of  the emerging 
development actors. In order to better engage the active role of  the 
emerging actors, the Busan outcome document agreed to the principles 
of  country ownership, transparency and accountability, and inclusive 
partnership that would involve shared goals, but ‘differentiated 
commitments on a “voluntary basis” ’ (Fourth High Level Forum on 
Aid Effectiveness 2011). This was a big compromise made by the 
Paris Club in order to ‘buy-in’ more stakeholders, particularly China, 
India, and others. China participated in the event with a relatively 
modest-level delegation, but emphasised the need for a different role 
in SSC, and remained reluctant to join the new club (Atwood 2012). 
Here, the HLF-4 marked its third expansion wave in the international 
development cooperation system that had previously been dominated 
by the West. This expansion indeed generated a series of  impacts on the 
international development architecture.
First, the broad-based development issues that developing countries 
are interested in, replaced the issue of  aid effectiveness that the most 
developed group was interested in. Second, the Working Party on 
Aid Effectiveness (WP-EFF) was formally replaced by the GPEDC. 
Finally, global development cooperation institutions that had been 
predominantly influenced by the OECD-DAC changed to become a 
more inclusive partnership mechanism. However, despite these positive 
changes, the fundamental influence of  the West’s development ideology 
still exists, which to some degree explains the reluctant attitude to the 
new partnership by the new development actors. This is largely because 
that effective voice of  the developing countries and emerging actors 
could not only rely on legitimate governing mechanisms in order to 
be heard, but would also substantively depend on many other factors. 
The West’s dominant role in international development is heavily based 
on its well-articulated knowledge and knowledge production system, 
which has lasted for over 60 years. Unfortunately, other developing 
countries and emerging actors have been unable to assert a similar 
influence. International development institutions have produced a 
150 | Li et al. Perspectives on the Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation
Vol. 49 No. 3 July 2018: ‘Emerging Economies and the Changing Dynamics of Development Cooperation’
strong path-dependence that may be difficult to change in the short 
term. Hence, to a large extent, the new partnership might not be able to 
change the nature of  the global development regime.
3 South–South cooperation and the OECD-DAC
In order to understand the unwillingness of  countries which are 
actively engaging and promoting SSC to join and actively work within 
the framework of  the GPEDC, it is important to highlight how the 
approach of  the SSC differs from that of  the OECD-DAC. To explore 
the complexity of  this difference, it is important to recognise both 
individual cooperation and the blockages in SSC, and the problems 
of  coordinating SSC methods with the OECD-DAC. This will be 
discussed further in later sections by looking at the engagement of  active 
SSC countries as donors in the international aid system.
3.1 Reasons for a possible clash between the DAC and SSC in the GPEDC
South–South cooperation has rapidly evolved since it was first formally 
recognised through the recommendation of  the United Nations 
General Assembly to create the United Nations Office for South–South 
Cooperation (UNOSSC) in 1974 (UN 1974). The idea behind 
establishing SSC was to oppose the OECD-DAC ODA which mostly 
focuses on monetary issues and the transfer of  public funds. Yiping 
Zhou, the director of  the Special Unit for South–South Cooperation in 
UNDP described the main unique characteristic of  SSC compared to 
ODA as the following:
South–South development assistance is manifested in public and 
private funding or partnerships as developing countries see value 
in creating beneficial environments for trade, investment and 
development in partner countries using their full range of  resources – 
both public and private. In this context, development assistance from 
one developing country to another is to be seen as a continuum from 
policy advice to technical assistance to pre‐investment activities – all 
working seamlessly together to create an enabling policy, institutional, 
technical as well as environment [sic] for sustaining economic growth. 
Thus, public and private support to developing countries is not 
compartmentalized (OECD 2010).
This clearly indicates the importance of  looking at SSC via different 
channels and the need for a global development partnership, to 
avoid dominance of  the ODA channel over the channels SSC uses to 
promote development in the global South. In addition to paying more 
attention to the different channels, it is also important to highlight the 
attributes of  SSC. Compared to the OECD-DAC approach, Southern 
development assistance is less conditional and tries to interfere less with 
a country’s internal affairs. When it comes to channels of  assistance, 
Southern aid tends to be more direct. Most South–South assistance is 
directed towards infrastructure. It is also normally more flexible and 
low-cost orientated; however, this might lead to lower standards such as 
ones that relate to environmental issues (UN ECOSOC 2008).
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It seems to be a logical conclusion that several problems may arise 
when trying to merge these two systems. Analysing the GPEDC Mexico 
Communiqué reveals both the reasoning behind it and the main 
obstacles. The Communiqué (GPEDC 2014) continues to stress the 
importance of  ODA as the main source of  international development 
assistance in the shift from aid effectiveness to development cooperation.
Key points which can be found in the Communiqué (GPEDC 2014) 
and which indicate potential conflicting issues, are the following:
 l ODA needs to remain the main source of  development assistance;
 l It is reaffirmed that South–South cooperation differs from North–
South cooperation;
 l ODA flows should stay predictable;
 l Actions for countries receiving insufficient assistance are needed;
 l It is stressed that global development cooperation will not be effective 
if  support to MICs were to be phased out. However, support to 
MICs should not be undertaken at the expense of  the support 
provided to countries with lower incomes.
Hence, it can clearly be seen that, even in this formal Communiqué, the 
MICs in particular are afraid of  decreasing flows of  ODA, and that the 
OECD-DAC would like them to shoulder more of  the financial burden 
of  ODA. The inhibition of  the emerging powers to participate in a 
formal framework, even though the GPEDC is a long way from being 
institutionalised, can only be overcome when the MICs feel the security 
of  showing international dominance as donors of  development aid 
without fearing further decreases in ODA to their countries. Moreover, 
the founding of  institutions in the global South such as the India–
Brazil–South Africa Dialogue Forum (IBSA), the Asian Infrastructure 
Investment Bank (AIIB), or the New Development Bank (NDB) shows 
the trend of  more autonomous emerging powers. Therefore, connecting 
the North and the South also requires active support and participation 
from the OECD member states in these institutions. The refusal of  
major donors such as the USA or Japan to join the AIIB illustrates the 
widening gap between traditional actors in international development 
assistance and the new players.
Another problem is that emerging countries may fear that their role 
in development assistance is put on a level with China, even when 
their volume of  development aid contributions is much smaller. As an 
extreme counter-measure, this could also lead to them teaming up with 
China and creating a block which opposes Western donors (Li and 
Wang 2014).
The main concerns of  the rising powers can be separated into the 
sub-topics of  political legitimacy, attribution of  responsibilities, 
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definition of  the agenda, and trust. In terms of  political legitimacy, 
the rising powers would prefer the UN and its structure for dealing 
with these issues, since the UN has a higher level of  legitimacy. The 
attribution of  responsibilities accounts for the fear of  a decrease in the 
responsibilities of  the OECD-DAC, and the fact that development 
cooperation should follow the common but differentiated responsibilities 
(CBDR) approach. Regarding definition of  the agenda, it is necessary 
for the rising powers that the GPEDC focuses more on the framework 
of  SSC, in particular the principle of  mutual economic benefit, and 
focuses less on aid as only concessional financial flows. However, the 
trust issue might be one of  the most important, since the rising powers 
fear that the West will try to maintain the current level of  power 
balance, and will try to create additional burdens, or withdraw support, 
thus blocking the rising powers from achieving their goals (Constantine, 
Shankland and Gu 2015).
The draft outcome of  the Second High Level Meeting of  the Global 
Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation (GPEDC) in 
December 2016 in Nairobi shows how some of  these problems were 
addressed. Key issues and solutions to be agreed on were outlined in 
connection to the problems between the OECD-DAC, SSC, MICs, 
and the rising powers. This differs to the 2014 Communiqué and is 
more positive regarding the role of  MICs in relation to SSC. The key 
issues relevant for SSC and MICs in the draft outcome of  the Nairobi 
meeting in 2016 are the following which should be seen in contrast to 
the Communiqué of  2014:
 l The development of  graduation policies for MICs which are 
sequenced, phased, and gradual, and represent in the best way the 
opportunities and challenges of  MICs;
 l The recommendation that MICs should start sharing their 
experience with low-income countries (LICs);
 l The recommendation that development cooperation should 
address the transition challenges faced by countries joining the 
middle-income category;
 l The recommendation that methodologies need to be devised to 
better account for the complex and diverse realities of  MICs;
 l It is noted that South–South cooperation is a complement to, and not 
a substitute for, North–South cooperation but it should be continued 
to increase accountability and transparency;
 l The impact of  SSC should be assessed with a view to improving, as 
appropriate, its quality in a results-orientated manner;
 l SSC should disseminate results, share lessons and good practices, and 
replicate initiatives (GPEDC 2016).
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Compared to the 2014 Communiqué, the expected outcome for the 
Second High Level Meeting seems to address more comprehensively 
the concerns of  middle-income countries, and the clause that SSC is 
a complement and not a substitute to North–South cooperation is a 
strong statement towards the MICs and the rising powers. It is hoped 
that more accommodation between the two sides in this issue will lead 
towards improved levels of  cooperation, especially in the case of  China 
and India.
4 China’s perspective on the GPEDC
Although the GPEDC has much higher legitimacy than any other 
previous form of  development cooperation partnership initiated by 
the OECD-DAC in terms of  representation, the follow-up Mexico 
City Forum was delayed for two and a half  years. Funding for joint 
secretariat support had not been secured until the Mexico City Forum. 
It was clear that even within the traditional donors’ group, there was 
still a lack of  confidence that the new partnership would lead to the 
expected results. It can even be argued that similar to the HLF-4, the 
organisers neglected the differences among the different parties just in 
order to obtain signatures. It can be seen that, in reality, the partnership 
would remain on paper.
First, it had taken hard work and late-night negotiations to get China, 
India, and Brazil to agree to sign the HLF-4 outcome document. 
However, China completely declined to attend the following event in 
Mexico City. Despite the offer made to either compromise on shifting 
the agenda from aid effectiveness to development effectiveness, or on 
the composition of  the governance structure of  the new partnership, 
the core values of  the partnership remained aid-based with mutual 
accountability. The new partnership can therefore be seen as a 
DAC-driven process, since the main initiative and methodology comes 
from the DAC. The big emerging economies realised that the openness 
of  this new partnership initiated by the DAC was more so because of  
the growing role of  emerging actors in the global economy, and the 
increasing difficulties that traditional donors faced in providing financial 
support to international development. They were afraid of  being 
brought in to cover the bill that traditional donors have amassed over 
decades of  failed development practices.
Despite having a unified group with very different policy approaches, 
they all shared a disapproval for the mainstream aid-based framework 
which they believed still reflected a Northern paradigm of  development, 
and as such, they never wanted to subscribe to this. Although critiques 
are that China’s growing role in international development largely 
undermines the good governance agenda that the traditional donors 
have generally dismissed as alternative development experiences, other 
emerging actors endorsed this. And so, the emerging economies took 
this new partnership as another type of  skilful methodology that the 
West executed in order to reinforce the existing development regime. 
From the Chinese perspective, this new partnership, reinforced by the 
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HLF-4, signalled the further expansion of  the Western-dominated 
international development discourse, as the West has been 
using a similar approach through its institutional structures and 
well-elaborated framework to safely ‘buy-in’ others in order to sustain its 
fundamental agenda.
Second, the emerging economies perceived the new partnership as the 
strategy to acquire more financial resources to share so-called ‘common 
goals’. Under the financial demand scenario, those most developing 
countries which needed financial inflows would rationally follow the 
call for the participation of  emerging actors because aid is less costly 
than other forms of  financial flow. In this regard, the new partnership 
has sufficient support from many developing countries, which creates 
political pressure on emerging actors, despite emerging economies’ 
insistence that they engage with other developing countries only if  
there is mutual benefit through SSC, rather than from donor–recipient 
aid flow. Therefore, emerging actors were fearful because once they 
joined the new partnership, their approach to mainly engage in 
learning and exchange, solidarity, and mutually beneficial economic 
cooperation would be undermined by the donor–recipient model. 
Broadly speaking, politically, if  they did not fulfil the ‘commitment’ 
which is even differentiated by ‘common goals’, then the leading 
position of  China and India within the developing group may have 
been challenged. Subsequently, the emerging economies were afraid 
of  being hijacked politically if  they took part in this new partnership. 
Instead, the emerging actors identified other options such as the Global 
Development Forum under the UN system and the G20 Development 
Group, as this new partnership did not seem to offer much value.
Third, the main concern for emerging actors particularly from China, 
is the approach of  how to promote development. China certainly 
welcomed the shift of  aid effectiveness to development effectiveness 
during the HLF-4. China also appreciated multi-stakeholder 
participation in global development policy (Gu 2015). However, both 
the Busan outcome document and the Mexico City outcome still 
maintained the belief  that developing countries need to create good 
conditions such as good governance, corruption-free institutions, gender 
equity, and other kinds of  social, political, and institutional conditions. 
China and other emerging actors do agree to these conditions to some 
extent, and could also argue that these stated conditions could be 
achieved along with development progress or as the pre-conditions.
Therefore, the question is not so much about the structure, as it is about 
the approach and framework that are deeply rooted in the Western-
based knowledge of  development. This knowledge is very much about 
the marriage between neoliberalism and neo-institutionalism, based 
on a well-established knowledge production system which constantly 
generates a set of  seemingly undeniable theories that create the field 
of  development studies and produce ‘independent development industries’ 
to justify and sustain this development business. China and other new 
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players may have difficulty in not only owning this process, but also 
sharing the cost, because under this knowledge gap, China and other 
players struggle to benefit from equal and mutual communication. 
China and other players might also insist on SSC by advocating a 
‘non-interference policy’ towards partnership, one that does not focus on 
immediate institutional reforms to provide ‘conditions’ for development. 
China and others may still feel weak in this new more open partnership 
with its wider participation, because the OECD-DAC family has strong 
mechanisms for consensus and joint action through a well-established 
donor coordination mechanism.
Fourth, both the Busan and Mexico City forums continued to be driven 
by an aid-industry-based system, which was very much engaged in 
aid management and the continuous efforts to make financial flows to 
the pre-existing aid-based system. This is an essential incentive for the 
DAC’s agenda to support this new partnership. To justify the budget 
to allocate to development cooperation in the DAC, member countries 
would be required firstly to meet the domestic political demand, as 
elaborated on during HLF-4 by Hillary Clinton regarding the USA’s 
policies in development financing. This would not necessarily create 
a conflict with the commitment that the aid budget could be effective 
for development, but would certainly limit aid resources to prioritise 
effective development. This is because very often, in an effort to 
prioritise development in most developing countries, it means that 
member countries cannot meet the political, environmental, and 
social requirements set by traditional donor countries. The mutual 
accountability regarding the conditions set by donor countries and the 
need of  recipient countries is often controversial. Although the Accra 
Action Plan called for using an in-country system, and it was also put 
forward as one of  the indicators to measure aid effectiveness, the mutual 
accountability regarding the conditions set by donor countries and the 
need of  recipient countries is often controversial. However, the key 
question was the extent to which implementation would move beyond 
the existing system to address concerns such as those of  civil society 
that, without greater inclusivity and a strong rights-based approach, the 
Plan could simply become ‘another set of  empty promises and targets’ 
(Better Aid Coordinating Group 2009: 16). 
Lastly, emerging countries seem much more likely to create their 
own platform on which they feel more open and equal. Although the 
Development Working Group has not yet addressed the development 
cooperation issues of  member countries, China has become more 
active in consulting domestically and internationally for a development 
agenda within the G20 Agenda (Gu 2017). The G20 will likely act as 
another legitimate platform for coordination or norm-setting within 
the new global development architecture. The thinktanks from India, 
China, Brazil, and South Africa initiated the Network of  Southern 
Think Tanks (NeST) during the Mexico City Forum; however, the 
NeST was seemingly unhappy to be included as part of  the follow-up 
actions outlined by the forum. The recently concluded South–South 
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Cooperation Conference in Delhi, India signalled the commitment 
from the South to move beyond the traditional SSC paradigm, and the 
beginning of  a systematic development framework and accountability 
system SSC. Along with the process of  operationalising the NDB and 
the AIIB, the emerging players will have a variety of  mechanisms to 
discuss global development issues.
5 India’s perspective on the GPEDC
To understand the perspective of  India on the GPEDC, it is important 
to see the evolution and scope of  Indian development cooperation. 
India’s development cooperation approach is mainly based around SSC, 
and some of  its main features are the principle of  mutual benefit and 
the demand-led nature of  India’s development cooperation. India tries 
to pursue real partnership through development cooperation. However, 
principles like these are not formalised and articulated in India’s policy 
sphere (Chaturvedi et al. 2014).
When compared to China and Brazil, India seems to be more of  a 
minor player in international development cooperation. Most of  the 
academic studies and international attention has been targeted on these 
two rather than on India which has followed the principles of  SSC 
since its independence in 1948, and has always provided a share to 
help fellow developing countries. Therefore, India’s increasing activity 
in development assistance and cooperation can be seen as a desire for 
global recognition. India hereby follows the approach of  Brazil and 
China and wants to be called a development partner rather than a 
donor, which is also consistent with most of  the other emerging powers. 
India’s ambition to fulfil a larger international role was also supported 
by its ability to promote the blocking of  processes in institutions such 
as the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the World Intellectual 
Property Organization (WIPO). India could do this by consolidating the 
group of  developing countries together with Brazil and South Africa. 
India actively offers its approach to share each other’s strength rather 
than only offering altruism as an alternative to the normative approach 
of  the DAC donors (Chaturvedi 2012).
Since India follows the approach to be a so-called ‘development 
partner’, it avoids engagement in a process such as the GPEDC, 
thus not ending up in a situation where a close political relation or 
partnership with the DAC or accepting its principles might imply that 
India sees itself  as a donor country. This is connected with the overall 
issue that emerging powers which are getting stronger might end up 
in the situation that traditional donor countries and their respective 
taxpayers stop seeing them as developing countries, and start reducing 
aid for them (Zimmermann and Smith 2011).
One of  the most sensitive issues for India connected to this was already 
visible during the Busan process. India, together with Brazil and 
China, made it clear that under no circumstances do they want any 
monitoring from the Northern DAC countries, since such monitoring 
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could later make them accountable in terms of  their accomplished 
aid. Even though monitoring would be a huge improvement for global 
development, it could not be implemented at all due to the heavy 
resistance of  India, China, and Brazil back then (Atwood 2012).
There are several reasons why India rejects a higher level of  
participation in international frameworks or partnerships in particular 
outside of  the UN framework. India is a country which has experienced 
high levels of  growth since it opened up its economy in the early 
1990s, and the increasing volume of  technical assistance indicates that 
it will be able to rise in the foreseeable future to becoming a major 
development partner. However, India still faces huge levels of  poverty in 
some of  its rural and even urban areas, and a reduction in international 
aid received would have dramatic consequences for the country’s 
population and food safety. However, even without further engagement 
in partnerships such as the GPEDC, India will slowly lose its status 
and reputation as a developing country and will be more measured 
in crude economic terms. For example, India was already the biggest 
source of  Greenfield Investment in Hungary in 2014 and 2015. Total 
foreign direct investment (FDI) from India just to Hungary is already 
close to US$1.5bn (HIPA 2016). The same happens in the UK where 
India became the third largest source of  FDI in 2015 (The Times of  India 
2016). With such huge numbers of  financial outflow from India, it is 
likely that the motivation of  Western donors to maintain their current 
levels of  aid might decrease.
Furthermore, Indian development assistance strongly follows the 
principles of  SSC. India does not hide that it sees a main purpose 
in development aid to be a strategic measure to establish economic 
relations and to allow its small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) 
to enter and penetrate foreign markets. The SSC principle that 
development assistance should have mutual benefits is clearly visible in 
the case of  India. There is also no visible interest in following the DAC 
approach which includes giving unconditional aid. As a recipient of  aid 
which mainly relied on loans, India fosters its approach of  extending 
lines of  credit. Its focus tends to be more on providing capacity-building 
measures or technical assistance than on giving out aid, and if  it gives 
out aid it is more targeted towards its neighbouring states to establish 
strong political and economic relations.
Nevertheless, it is still important to distinguish India’s case from 
China’s. India’s development cooperation is unique most of  all because 
of  six factors: ‘(1) It is sustainable and inclusive; (2) based on India’s 
development experience; (3) without conditionalities; (4) demand driven; 
(5) based on mutual gains, and (6) contributing to India’s soft power’ 
(Chaturvedi et al. 2014: 4).
Those principles are close to China’s principles, as both countries base 
their principles on the 1953 ‘Five Principles of  Peaceful Coexistence’ 
(Li et al. 2014) and the 1955 Bandung conference which can also be 
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seen as a launching point for SSC long before it was officially recognised 
by the UN. However, there are still some differences between China’s 
and India’s development principles. China and India each follow their 
own path to provide development assistance. China is addressing the 
hard infrastructure gap which can again be seen by the establishment 
of  the AIIB, while India addresses more the issue of  capacity building. 
The latter approach helped India to avoid the international focus and 
the problems for China which came with it. Nevertheless, both countries 
lack a strong bilateral and possible trilateral development strategy, and 
establishing joint projects might be a strong catalyst for regional and 
global development (Li and Zhou 2016).
If  the GPEDC wants to involve India as an active actor, the current 
framework will possibly not provide a solution. In addition to not 
monitoring its activities, India will continue to insist on not having 
binding principles. Therefore, changing the GPEDC more towards a 
knowledge platform and increasing the weight of  SSC compared to 
traditional ODA might facilitate a change in the current situation. First 
of  all, India wants to be seen as what it is: a strong, growing economy 
which, nevertheless, still struggles with poverty and is highly dependent 
on aid in some sectors. The current gridlock can only be overcome if  
Western donors can guarantee that India will be able to maintain the 
current levels of  aid it receives.
6 Brazil as a fading Southern power
Until recently, the Brazilian government was keen to affirm its Southern 
identity and separation from a space perceived as dominated by the 
hegemonic North, including the GPEDC. Over the last decade, Brazil has 
frequently been depicted as a rising power or as an emergent Southern 
influence in a changing geopolitical order. This happened in a context of  
economic prosperity in Brazil that helped to boost the country’s stance in 
foreign affairs. The construction of  the Southern identity also reflected a 
particular party-politics configuration in Brazil where the leading left-wing 
ideology of  the Workers’ Party (PT) was favourable to a counter-hegemonic 
role in foreign politics and, as part of  that, greater engagement with 
Southern nations and diversification away from traditional Northern 
partners, such as the USA and Europe. Recently, however, Brazil’s 
Southern power identity seems to be fading away for reasons to do with 
(again) domestic politics, the state of  the Brazilian economy, and the 
underwhelming performance of  the country’s SSC.
Brazil rose to prominence in international development from the mid 
to late 2000s with an active foreign policy towards the South steered by 
a charismatic president, Lula da Silva, who took an active role in the 
country’s diplomacy (Amorim 2010). Brazil’s ascendency in international 
development is illustrated by the exponential increase in resources and 
pledges for development cooperation in the late-2000s, the consolidation 
of  a place on the side of  the likes of  Russia, India, and China (that 
collectively with South Africa make up the so-called ‘BRICs’), the 
successful bids for the leadership of  international governing bodies, 
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such as the Food and Agriculture Organization of  the United Nations 
(FAO) and the WTO (currently headed by Brazilian nationals), and 
the internationalisation of  Brazilian businesses, with new trade and 
investment deals going hand-in-hand with SSC, particularly in Africa.
Although committed to multilateralism (Visentini and Silva 2010) and 
the ‘minilateralism’ of  fora such as the BRICS, IBSA, or the Community 
of  Portuguese Language Countries (CPLP), Brazil’s Southerly-bent 
foreign policy has emphasised the country’s unique contribution to 
international development through South–South relations that comprise 
diplomacy, technical cooperation, and business (White 2010, 2013). 
Brazil’s claimed successful public policies and technological innovations 
were deemed particularly fit for other developing countries, particularly 
within the tropics where affinities were greatest (Cabral and Shankland 
2013). Also, Brazil’s SSC was more than a charitable endeavour between 
donor and recipient, but was described as a mutually beneficial affair 
between partners (Abreu 2013), much like China and India portray their 
engagements with developing countries.
Foreign policy activism waned under the presidency of  Dilma Rousseff 
and the budget for technical cooperation was first frozen and then 
slashed. The economic downturn put significant pressure on the 
government and eventually led to the president’s removal from office. In 
the meantime, Brazilian businesses abroad had been struggling with a 
less favourable environment (e.g. the fall in commodity prices) and were 
further weakened by the political crisis that eventually led to President 
Rousseff’s impeachment in 2016.
The new conservative government, led by President Michel Temer, that 
abruptly took office in 2016, announced major policy turns. Regarding 
foreign policy, the Southern identity rhetoric has been replaced with the 
reinforcement of  alliances with traditional Northern nations – such as 
the USA – and a stronger narrative on business and bilateralism (MRE 
2016). China and India are still viewed as strategic partners, although 
some have talked about ‘Braxit’, the voluntary (or altogether forced) exit 
of  Brazil from the BRICS club (Simha 2016). Even if  Brazil remains in 
the club, the counter-hegemonic soft power element will surely vanish 
on the Brazilian side. As for Africa, the new foreign ministry sees it as a 
big and expanding market that needs to be engaged with pragmatically, 
and with clear benefits for Brazil, leaving behind the compassionate 
rhetoric and diplomatic extravagances of  previous PT-led governments 
(MRE 2016). Indeed, the new minister of  agriculture, Blairo Maggi, 
noted when taking office that Brazil cannot distribute its agricultural 
technology to Africa for free (Ramos 2016).
Brazil’s commitment to multilateralism and to Southern solidarity 
(even if  the latter has been topped with a generous dose of  rhetoric), 
may be at stake and this may compromise the country’s contribution to 
sustainable global development.
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6.1 Why Brazil’s Southern identity remains important
There are at least two reasons why Brazil’s Southern identity 
remains important (Cabral 2017). One concerns geopolitics and 
counterweighting the world’s hegemons – being the USA or China 
– in international development. Brazil’s Southern assertion has been 
part and parcel of  a campaign for democratising global governance 
and the reinforcement of  multilateralism. With regard to sustainable 
global development specifically, Brazil has demonstrated considerable 
engagement with the process, leading to the ratification of  the SDGs, 
and its SDG position paper (Ministry of  External Relations 2014) 
highlights areas of  contribution to sustainable development and the role 
played by SSC in that process.
Indeed, the second reason concerns the uniqueness of  Brazil’s potential 
engagement with other developing or Southern nations through SSC. 
It is not the win–win formula that makes Brazil an exceptional partner 
– China and India have proved to be much more skilled in practising 
win–win cooperation. The uniqueness of  Brazil as an international 
development partner results from the country’s own development 
trajectory and its experiences with holistic social policies, deliberative 
democracy, and technological innovations that constitute key references 
for global development, and have indeed been emphasised in Brazil’s 
pre-Temer contribution to the formulation of  the SDGs. Many of  these 
experiences have a distinctive Southern (in the sense of  non-conformist 
and non-conventional) flavour that the current conservative government 
risks failing to acknowledge or understand.
Yet, the transfer of  Brazil’s appealing innovations into other contexts 
is not straightforward. The socio-political fabric that generated these 
innovations, such as a particular state–society dynamic, is not easily 
replicable. It should not be taken for granted that Brazil’s agrarian 
structures have a similar match in Africa and hence call for similar 
struggles. And one should not assume that the institutional machinery 
of  African governments (and indeed social checks and balances) can 
cope with the types of  technological innovations (such as those which 
have resulted from the establishment of  a massive continental-size 
research corporation) and multi-dimensional social experiments (as 
Brazil’s equally massive social protection programmes) that Brazil has 
managed to generate.
Furthermore, getting over-enthusiastic about Brazil’s uniqueness 
and success may be counterproductive. Asserting Brazil’s unique 
contribution should not be about celebrating Brazilian ways and trying 
to emulate them, but it should be about reflecting on Brazil’s domestic 
trajectories and how they were generated, and the lessons emerging 
from this. Reflecting and reflexivity are the key words, and this requires 
a considerable change in attitudes by those at the front line of  Brazilian 
official and non-official diplomacy (being state or non-state actors). 
The presumption of  South–South affinities has often been taken too 
far, particularly vis-à-vis Africa, with an over-confident reliance on the 
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Brazilian brand, that has compromised the ability to engage with the 
needs, aspirations, and perspectives of  partners in other countries.
The future of  Brazilian SSC and how it will relate to the other rising 
and Southern powers in international development is uncertain. Thus 
far, the study of  Brazilian cooperation has been confined to a particular 
historical moment of  Brazilian politics (and diplomacy) that has led to the 
categorisation of  Brazil as an unquestionable Southern power. It remains 
to be seen whether our understanding of  Brazil’s position in international 
development – with its Southern turn, its solidarity diplomacy, its SSC 
principles, and warm relationship with other emerging powers – will need 
to be revised, once, in a climate of  greater political stability, the Brazilian 
government clarifies its international development policy.
7 Conclusions and recommendations
The international aid system was born out of  the ruins of  the Second 
World War, with aid or ODA as a main operational instrument and 
channel of  influence. During the Cold War era, the system mainly used 
ODA to support allies. After the Cold War, the allocation of  ODA began 
to shift to the countries beyond the scope of  Cold War alliances, and 
became more strongly guided by poverty alleviation and development 
concerns. It was at this stage that the international aid system began 
to focus on aid effectiveness, and eventually moved to the post-aid 
framework that emerged with the establishment of  the GPEDC at the 
HLF-4. However, despite the changing form and increasing participation 
of  multiple stakeholders, the current system is the result of  continuous 
expansion of  Western-based aid at different times under different 
geopolitical contexts. The shift from an initial belief  in the modernisation 
model for development to the current marriage of  neoliberal and 
neo-institutionalist models for poverty reduction has not resulted in a 
substantive change of  the ‘conditional development approach’ that has applied 
to developing countries through the aid-based paradigm.
A central argument in relation to the international development 
assistance system has been the relationship between aid, growth, and 
development, so that aid can be properly directed and managed in areas 
such as health and basic education. The HLF-4 sought to examine 
progress in the quality of  aid with regard to the relationship between 
aid and development, which was measured by meeting the Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs), particularly poverty reduction targets. 
The agenda eventually shifted to a focus on development effectiveness, 
emphasised by the GPEDC. The attempt to increase the voice of  
multiple stakeholders in international development cooperation policy 
was a bold, if  unavoidable, initiative. However, the lack of  experience 
and non-aid resources by DAC members would make it difficult for the 
GPEDC to adopt a truly new approach. Instead, aid has remained the 
main instrument driving the GPEDC agenda.
It is widely agreed that the GPEDC is a more open and legitimate 
platform for discussing international development cooperation than 
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previous ones (Li 2017). However, there is also the view that the 
DAC remains very influential in setting the procedures, instruments, 
and mechanisms for monitoring and evaluating the performance of  
development interventions. Disappointingly, the involvement of  key 
players like China in the definition and design of  these procedures and 
mechanisms has not been sought or encouraged.
As a result, China and other emerging players have not actively 
engaged with the GPEDC. In order for that to change, the GPEDC 
needs to demonstrate a more internationally inclusive approach and 
global legitimacy. This may require a stronger connection with the 
UN Development Financing Forum and with the G20 Development 
Working Group. Furthermore, the GPEDC also needs to gain a better 
understanding of  how diverse international players institutionally 
manage their development cooperation programmes, to ensure it gets 
the right stakeholders in order to get an effective response.
China’s remarkable development trajectory has been acknowledged by 
the international community. Furthermore, recently new cooperation 
frameworks such as triangular Africa–China–UK, Africa–China–USA, 
and Africa–China–Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation cooperation 
illustrate the convergence between China and individual traditional 
donors and their willingness to promote global development in a 
cohesive way. Despite the dominant role of  the DAC in the normative 
framework for international development, the practice of  cooperation 
has undergone significant changes. This creates a momentum for 
new influential players such as China, India, or Brazil (though the 
latter’s predisposition towards other Southern players is currently 
unclear), to play their important role in the global governance of  
international development cooperation. However, the emerging powers 
need to consider carefully how to engage effectively with upcoming 
GPEDC fora, and particularly what appropriate level of  political and 
institutional representation should be sent to these policy spaces.
Notes
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